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Since this survey' is a continuation of previous articles,2 the same
policies of selection will be used and developments in the various areas
will be presented as an integrated continuum.
1. This survey includes cases reported in 177 So.2d through 200 So.2d 160 and laws
enacted by the 1967 General Session of the Florida Legislature and the 1967 Extraordinary
Session of the Florida Legislature.
CRIMINAL LAW
I. CImINAL PROCEDURE RULE No. 1.8503
In previous surveys4 all cases which dealt with the Rule were dis-
cussed together in order to emphasize its scope and function.5 In the
present survey only the procedural aspects of the rule will be discussed
in this section.
A. Matters Subject to Direct Appeal
Since the rule was designed for collateral attack, ordinarily it may
not be used to review matters which could have been raised on direct
appeal. Thus the issue of the involuntary nature of a confession,6 an
alleged error in jury instructions, 7 and an alleged error for failing to
2. Wills, Criminal Law, Survey of Florida Law, 14 U. MiAmi L. REV. 521 (1960); Wills,
Criminal Law, Survey of Florida Law, 16 U. MImi L. REV. 225 (1961); Wills, Criminal
Law, Survey of Florida Law, 18 U. Mi'vri L. REV. 381 (1963); Wills, Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure, Survey of Florida Law, 20 U. MmI L. REV. 246 (1965).
3. MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE OR CORRECT SENTENCE; HEARING;
APPEAL:
A prisoner in custody under Sentence of a court established by the Laws of
Florida claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or Laws of the United States, or of the
State of Florida, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,
or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is other-
wise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to
vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served
upon the prosecuting attorney of the court, grant a prompt hearing thereon, deter-
mine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto.
If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the
sentence imposed was not authorized by law or is otherwise open to collateral attack,
or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of
the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court
shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence
him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the pro-
duction of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive
motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
An appeal may be taken to the appropriate appellate court from the order en-
tered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas
corpus.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is author-
ized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this rule, shall not be entertained if it
appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court
which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears
that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.
Note: Formerly Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1.
4. Wills, Criminal Law, Survey of Florida Law, 18 U. MIAmi L. REV. 381 (1963): Wills,
Criminal Law and Procedure, Survey of Florida Law, 20 U. MiAmi L. REV. 246 (1965).
5. For excellent related material see Roy v. Wainwright, 151 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1963)
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1951); FED. R. CR-. P. 35; 4 Barron & Holtzoff,
FEDEmA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2306; Bowman, Processing a Motion Attaching Sen-
tence Under Section 2255 of the Judicial Code, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 788 (1963) and an ex-
cellent discussion by Justice Barns in Tolar v. State, 196 So.2d 1 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
6. Coyner v. State, 177 So.2d 715 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
7. Williams v. State, 184 So.2d 525 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
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grant a severance' are not reviewable under the rule. However the pro-
hibition is not absolute. If an appeal was difficult or impossible, and
reversible error might have occurred, appellate courts have ordered hear-
ings so that the issue may be determined on the merits.9 Therefore, hear-
ings have been ordered upon the following allegations: that the patent
failure of the attorney to file a timely notice of appeal prevented an
appeal;' ° that the failure to file a timely notice of appeal was due to
confusion in the Public Defender's Office;" that the Public Defender
refused to file a notice of appeal.'
The degree of prejudice is also a material factor. In Reddick v.
State3 a hearing was ordered where an accumulation of errors resulted
in a substantial deprivation of due process. The petitioner had plead
guilty under the reasonable impression that he would be sentenced to
life but instead received the death sentence. The court noted that the
criterion of whether a defendant was entitled to a hearing under the rule
was whether the entire record indicated that the defendant was denied a
fair trial.
B. In Custody Requirement
The rule provides that the petitioner must be in custody under the
sentence attacked. The courts have had some difficulty applying this
provision to consecutive sentences. Early appellate court decisions held
that if the first of the consecutive sentences had not been served com-
pletely the second could not be attacked. 4 This position was later re-
versed by the appellate courts on the theoretical basis that a prisoner
could be considered in custody under both sentences and on the practical
basis that the interests of all would be served by an early determination
of the issue. 5 The problem ultimately reached the Supreme Court of
Florida in a case which involved eleven consecutive sentences.' 6 The
court held that the rule required that the prisoner claim the right to be
released. Since all eleven sentences were under attack and the prisoner
would be released if he prevailed, the rule was satisfied. 7 This principle
prevented relief in several cases where the prisoner would not begin to
serve the sentence under attack until the expiration of a prior sentence.18
8. Robinson v. State, 194 So.2d 29 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
9. Jackson v. State, 166 So.2d 194 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
10. Miller v. State, 193 So.2d 647 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
11. Cannon v. State, 181 So.2d 584 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966), citing Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477 (1963).
12. Hinton v. State, 177 So.2d 522 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
13. 190 So.2d 340 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
14. Barnes v. State, 173 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) ; Cummings v. State, 166 So.2d
775 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964); White v. State, 165 So.2d 799 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
15. Dovico v. State, 178 So.2d 340 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Brawn v. State, 177 So.2d 547
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Jones v. State, 174 So.2d 452 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Falagon v. State,
167 So.2d 62 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
16. Johnson v. State, 184 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1966).
17. Johnson v. State, 185 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1966).
18. McDowell v. State, 195 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967) (even though the sentences were
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C. Successive Motions
The rule that the court is not required to entertain a second motion
which is not materially different from the first19 was followed rather
closely during the period surveyed. For example, the Supreme Court of
Florida 0 rejected the argument that a second motion should be allowed
because the record did not contain a copy of the first motion nor an
order denying it.2 However, exceptions occurred where the former denial
was not based on the merits and the record did not conclusively show that
the prisoner was not entitled to relief.22
D. Appeal from Rule No. 1.850 Hearings
Since a prisoner has no absolute right to counsel at Rule No. 1.850
hearings or appeals therefrom, the courts have granted several motions
for leave to withdraw where attorneys found no justifiable issue for
appeal.23
The Supreme Court of Florida 24 held that an appeal from Rule No.
1.850 hearings should be brought to the district courts of appeal even
where the prisoner was sentenced to death.
2 5
Ordinarily the court will not consider an issue on appeal which was
not raised previously. 6
II. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
27
A. Adequate Representation
Although the right to counsel implies the right to adequate represen-
tation, courts are extremely reluctant to afford relief on the basis of
inadequate representation. The announced criteria is: "[T]he substand-
ard level of the attorney's efforts reduced the trial to a mockery or
issued from different courts) ; Pritchett v. State, 193 So.2d 185 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966) ; Escue
v. State, 192 So.2d 524 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966) (an excellent analysis of the problem) ; Ervin v.
State, 189 So.2d 374 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966) ; Hill v. State, 184 So.2d 457 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966)
(prior sentence being served in another state).
19. Peterson v. State, 184 So.2d 503 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966); Johnson v. State, 181 So.2d
667 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
20. State v. Piehl, 184 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1966).
21. A dissenting opinion was based upon the view that the state failed to sustain the
burden of proving that the records conclusively showed that the prisoner was not entitled
to relief.
22. Coleman v. State, 189 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966); Taylor v. State, 181 So.2d
589 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1965).
23. Falagan v. State, 182 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966) ; Morris v. State, 187 So.2d 368
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1966) ; Price v. State 184 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966) ; Stewart v. State,
184 So.2d 489 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
24. Roberts v. State, 181 So.2d 646 (Fla. 1966).
25. Justice Erwin dissented.
26. Adams v. State, 179 So.2d 369 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
27. Cases where the right to counsel bears upon the admissibility of a confession will be
discussed in the "Confession" section.
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[farce.]" 28 The application of this test is no less stringent than the test
itself. Where the petitioner alleged that his attorney spent little time in
preparation, relief was denied. The court stated: "We think the issue-
would be that of opportunity for study and investigation rather than
actual performance of those duties by counsel."29 Relief was denied
where petitioners alleged that counsel advised a change of plea to guilty"
and where petitioner alleged that preparation time was inadequate.81
However, where the petitioner alleged both inadequate time for prepara-
tion and denial of his motion for continuance, a new trial was ordered. 2
B. Waiver
The law in this area 3 is designed to afford maximum protection to
the petitioner, and the courts have construed ambiguities in favor of the
petitioner. For example, in McKinsie v. State 4 the record showed that
the trial judge had instructed to the petitioner as follows:
You understand that you are entitled to have a jury sit over
there and hear the evidence and decide whether or not you are
guilty or innocent and a lawyer to represent you. The State will
pay for the lawyer if you are unable to hire one.
After an affirmative reply from the petitioner the court continued, "Or
you can plead guilty and let the court investigate it, throw yourself on
the mercy of the court." The petitioner plead guilty without assistance
of counsel. The applicable rule is that a plea of guilty at an arraignment
without the assistance of counsel and the failure to request counsel does
not necessarily constitute a waiver. 5 However, if the petitioner were in-
formed of his right to counsel and appointment if he could not afford
counsel, he must bear the burden of proving that he did not waive his
rights. A literal interpretation of this rule could place the burden upon
the petitioner. However, the court in McKinsie felt that an intelligent
waiver implied a choice between having representation at all stages or
not, and that the trial judge's remarks could be construed as a choice
between a jury trial with counsel or plea of guilty without. Further, the
court considered that the remarks of the trial judge gave the petitioner
the impression that counsel would be unnecessary if he pleaded guilty.
Therefore, the court held that the defendant had not waived his right
to counsel and that the dismissal of his petition without a hearing was
error.
28. Simpson v. State, 164 So.2d 224, 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
29. State v. Barton, 194 So.2d 241, 243 (Fla. 1967).
30. Simpson v. State, 181 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
31. McCray v. State, 181 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966); State v. Daniels, 178 So.2d
44 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965) ; Coyner v. State, 177 So.2d 715 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
32. Grizzell v. State, 189 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
33. Cases discussing the development of this area of law were discussed in Wills, Crim-
inal Law and Procedure, Survey of Florida Law, 20 U. MumvI L. REV. 253 (1965).
34. 187 So.2d 69, 70 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
35. Trepanier v. State, 181 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1965).
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In Stone v. State 6 the petitioner hired an attorney, and the trial
judge after discussion with all parties, appointed the same attorney to
defend the co-defendant. The court held that the petitioner had waived
his right to the undivided services of the attorney.
C. Critical Stages
Deprivation of assistance of counsel is reversible error only if the
deprivation occurred at a critical stage of criminal prosecution or on a
showing of special prejudice at non-critical stages. Therefore, the central
issue in many of the cases surveyed was the determination of which
stages are critical or what events are prejudicial.
1. OUT OF CUSTODY INTERROGATION
In Gordon v. Gerstein,37 the petitioner was called to testify before
the State Attorney at a hearing authorized by Florida Statutes, section
27.04 (1965)." The investigating officer proceeded without waiting for
the petitioner to arrange for counsel. The petitioner refused to testify in
absence of counsel and was cited for contempt. The Supreme Court of
Florida sustained the citation because: such hearings are open; the peti-
tioner's attorney could have been present; the petitioner had a duty to
speak and the fact that his testimony might have provided a basis for
criminal charges against him did not mean that he had a constitutional
right to the assistance of counsel. A federal case decided in 1957 was
cited as authority for the latter point.8 9
2. IN CUSTODY INTERROGATION
Arrest is not a critical stage. Thus, the failure to provide a defendant
an attorney immediately after arrest and prior to investigation was not
error, nor was interrogation during three months detention in the ab-
sence of proof of prejudice.4'
The courts have recognized that prejudicial error might result if an
interrogation after arrest in the absence of counsel produces incriminating
statements which in turn lead to a plea of guilty.42 However, such an
argument has not been sustained on appeals in Florida. Therefore, relief
36. 196 So.2d 445 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
37. 189 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1966).
38. The state attorney shall have summoned all witnesses required on behalf of the
state; and he is allowed the process of his court to summon witnesses from through-
out the state to appear before him in or out of term time at such convenient places
in the state attorney's judicial circuit and at such convenient times as may be desig-
nated in the summons, to testify before him as to any violation of the criminal law
upon which they may be interrogated, and he is empowered to administer oaths to
all witnesses summoned to testify by the process of his court or who may voluntarily
appear before him to testify as to any violation or violations of the criminal law.
39. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1956).
40. Gray v. State, 184 So.2d 206 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
41. Irving v. State, 192 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
42. Wright v. Dickson, 336 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1964).
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was denied where the plea was changed to not guilty,43 and where the
petitioner failed to allege that the plea of guilty was induced solely by
the confession.44 In a recent decision,45 the petitioner alleged that an
interrogation in the absence of counsel by the arresting officer and by
the trial judge, led to incriminating statements and a plea of guilty. Re-
lief was denied on the basis that the petitioner did not sustain the burden
of proving that the plea of guilty, made after the appointment of a Public
Defender, was "the product of a will overborne.
46
3. PRELIMINARY HEARING
Generally, the preliminary hearing is not considered a critical stage,
but two cases 4? following the principle announced in Harris v. State
48
found prejudice where the petitioner confessed without benefit of counsel
at the preliminary hearing and the magistrate testified at the trial that
the petitioner had admitted that the confession was true.
4. ARRAIGNMENT
The arraignment is not viewed as a critical stage but accepting a
plea of guilty at an arraignment without the assistance of counsel is
prejudicial.49 However, relief was denied in one case where the petitioner
alleged that the Public Defender was not present at the arraignment but
the record showed that the petitioner stated that the Public Defender
had been appointed to represent him.5" The portion of the record which
appeared in the appellate opinion showed dialogue between the trial judge
and the petitioner and did not reveal the presence of the Public Defender.
The court was not explicit, but apparently the decision was based upon
the view that the appointment of an attorney was sufficient.
Conviction of possession of firearms by a felon was reversed where
the prior felony conviction was based upon a plea of guilty made without
benefit of counsel. 5 '
5. AFTER FORMAL CHARGE BUT BEFORE TRIAL
Although no Florida cases were noted in the period covered by this
survey, the police practice in this area will no doubt be influenced by
United States v. Wade 2 which held that after indictment and appoint-
43. Taylor v. State, 169 So.2d 861 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
44. Thompson v. State, 176 So.2d 564 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
45. Dovico v. State, 199 So.2d 308 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
46. See FLA. R. Camn. P. 1.150(e).
47. Murray v. State, 191 So.2d 278 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966) ; Williams v. State, 184 So.2d
525 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
48. 162 So.2d 262 (Fla. 1964).
49. Sardinia v. State, 168 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1964).
50. Ramsey v. State, 198 So.2d 849 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
51. Davis v. State, 191 So.2d 440 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
52. 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967).
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ment of counsel the defendant had the right of assistance of counsel at
a lineup.
6. SENTENCE
Sentencing was held to be a critical stage even though the proceed-
ing was merely to correct a clerical error in the calculation of credit
time." Waiver of counsel at arraignment does not imply waiver at sen-
tencing.54
7. DIRECT APPEAL
Direct appeal is a critical stage.55 Where the defendant's request for
counsel on appeal was denied and the appeal period had run, the Supreme
Court of the United States ordered that measures be taken to afford
appellate review.56 The Supreme Court of Florida complied by ordering
review by means of habeas corpus."7 However, the right to counsel on
appeal is not absolute. Attorneys have petitioned for leave to withdraw
where they found no justiciable issue for appeal. Moreover, withdrawals
have been allowed where no attorney was appointed and the court, not
an attorney, decided that an appeal would be frivolous.
The position of the Florida courts is that the defendant does have
the right of appointment of counsel, but the right does not extend to re-
quiring the attorney to continue with an appeal that he considers to be
without merit.58 However, the courts are not prone to grant withdrawals
lightly. In Bashlor v. Wainwright59 Justices Drew and Erwin expressed
some reservations, and in Smith v. State6° the court stated:
It is becoming difficult to justify the difference between a need
for counsel in the trial court and finding that there is no need
of counsel in the appellate court ... in the future ... this court
will be more strict in permitting withdrawal of counsel of record
.* . to indigent defendants ....
Furthermore, in Gossett v. State6' the court pointed out:
This court has, in the past, permitted defense attorneys to with-
53. Thacker v. State, 185 So.2d 202 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
54. Fulmore v. State, 198 So.2d 101 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
55. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
56. Ho~lingshead v. Wainwright, 384 U.S. 31 (1966).
57. Hollingshead v. Wainwright,.194 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1967).
58. Baker v. Wainwright, 197 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1967); Smith v. State, 192 So.2d 346
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1966) ; Morris v. State, 189 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966) ; Williams v. State,
186 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966) ; McNealy v. State, 183 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966) ;
Carr v. State, 180 So.2d 381 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). However Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-502 pro-
vides that appeal shall be taken by appointed attorney where an indigent receives the death
sentence.
59. 189 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1966).
60. 192 So.2d 41, 42 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
61. 191 So.2d 281, 282 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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draw. . . . As a result, we have had a large number of cases
lodged here without representation. . . . [B]ecause of . . . the
confusion caused thereby, we are finding it necessary to refuse
to permit defense counsel to withdraw ....
8. PROBATION AND PAROL HEARINGS
Probation and parol hearings are not critical stages.62 A rather inter-
esting application of this policy occurred in Randall v. State.8 In the
absence of counsel the petitioner's sentence was set aside and he was
placed on probation. After revocation of probation he was resentenced in
the presence of counsel. The court rejected his argument that his right to
counsel at the probation hearing was violated and therefore time on pro-
bation should be credited against his subsequent sentence.
D. Juvenile Courts
The court in In Re T.W.P.64 held that failing to advise an indigent
juvenile of his right to counsel was not error because proceedings in
juvenile courts are not criminal in nature. The court circumvented Shiou-
takon v. District of Columbia" by noting that this decision was based
upon a statute rather than upon constitutional grounds. This issue was
resolved by the Supreme Court of the United States in Application of
Gault.6" The Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment requires that in proceedings to determine delinquency which
may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's free-
dom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child's
right to be represented by counsel retained by them or if they are unable
to afford counsel that counsel will be appointed to represent the child.67
E. Offenses Less than Felonies
The Supreme Court of Florida in Fish v. State68 held that the right
to counsel does not extend to those charged with misdemeanors. However,
the federal courts have recognized the defendant's right to counsel when
accused of a federal misdemeanor, 9 a state misdemeanor in Mississippi,7
and a state misdemeanor in Florida.
71
62. Shiplett v. Wainwright, 198 So.2d 647 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1967); Bryant v. State, 194
So.2d 21 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
63. 188 So.2d 334 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
64. 184 So.2d 507 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966), cert. dismissed, 188 So.2d 813 (Fla.1966), appeal
dismissed, 192 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 912 (1967).
65. 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
66. 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967).
67. The Court fortified its position by recommendations from the President's Crime
Commission.
68. 159 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1964).
69. Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
70. Harvey v. State of Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
71. McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965),
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In Rutledge v. City of Miami 2 the court in habeas corpus proceed-
ings discharged the petitioner, who, without benefit of counsel, had been
convicted and sentenced to 60 days in jail and ordered to pay a fine of
$500.00 or be jailed an additional 60 days by a municipal court for viola-
tions of a municipal ordinance. The federal court stated that it took
jurisdiction even though the petitioner had not sought relief in the state
courts because the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida clearly
showed that the petitioner had no adequate avenue of relief in the state
courts.
The Supreme Court of Florida considered the problem in Watkins v.
Morris73 and in State ex rel Taylor v. Warden of Orange County Prison
Farm.74 In both cases the court denied the right to counsel. In the latter
case which involved incarceration totaling 360 days for a violation of a
municipal ordinance, Justice Erwin dissented and suggested that the right
to counsel be recognized where the offense authorized a sentence of 30
days or more.
III. CONFESSIONS
The major operative rules in Florida have been that a voluntary
confession is admissible and an extra-judicial confession is not necessarily
rendered involuntary by the failure to advise the defendant of his right
to remain silent. Significant changes have occurred due to the influence
of Escobedo v. Illinois,75 Miranda v. Arizona,
76 Massiah v. United States77
and Wong Sun v. United States.
78
A. Right to Counsel and Right to be Silent
Application of the principles of Escobedo79 and Miranda0 has been
resisted. The courts have been reluctant to exclude confessions because
72. 267 F. Supp. 885 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
73. 179 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1965).
74. 193 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1967).
75. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
76. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
77. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
78. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
79. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964):
We hold therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general in-
quiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the
suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of inter-
rogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has
requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police
have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain
silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution "as made obligatory upon the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 342 and that no state-
ment elicited by the police during interrogation may be used against him at a
criminal trial.
80. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966):
To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to
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the right to counsel and right to remain silent were violated. Since Esco-
bedo and Miranda are not retroactive, the rules they announced were not
applied to any of the cases decided early in the period under survey.,,
Nor were the principles of Escobedo applied in cases where counsel was
neither requested nor refused,8 2 or where the defendant waived his right
to counsel, 83 or where the defendant testified that the statements in his
confession were true.84 In one case85 the defendant had been advised that
if he talked about any aspect of the case he would have to do so freely
and voluntarily. His request to call his attorney was granted. He confessed
after calling his attorney but before his attorney arrived. The majority
distinguished the facts from Escobedo on the basis that the defendant
knew that he had a right to wait for his attorney if he wished.
The principles of Escobedo and Miranda were applied in Collins v.
State"6 to effect a reversal. The defendant's confession was ruled inad-
missible since it was made without benefit of counsel and under extreme
mental duress. The case is particularly interesting because the court could
have circumvented the issue in three ways. First, the court could have
distinguished the case because the police had offered to procure counsel
for the defendant but he refused and preferred to call his father and
requested him to obtain counsel. Secondly, the court could have avoided
Miranda because the interrogation and trial occurred before Miranda.
The court said by way of footnote:
• . . Escobedo is clearly applicable to the instant case in point
of time. And to all intents and purposes while the trial in the
instant case was held before the Miranda opinion, the holdings
in Miranda are likewise applicable here for the reason that
everything said in Miranda was based directly upon previous
cases handed down by that Court...
questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safe-
guards must be employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective
means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the
exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are
required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that
he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the inter-
rogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him,
the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer questions or make a statement. But' unless and until such warnings and
waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a
result of interrogation can be used against him.
81. Watson v. State, 190 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1966); Broome v. State, 194 So.2d 31 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1967) ; Hilson v. State, 191 So.2d 90 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966) ; Carter v. State, 183 So.2d
883 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960) ; Lawrence v. State, 182 So.2d 467 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
82. McCumber v. State, 182 So.2d 627 (Fla. 3d 1966) ; Dampier v. State, 180 So.2d 183
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1965); Moffett v. State, 179 So.2d 408 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965); Nixon v. State,
178 So.2d 620 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) ; Myrick v. State, 177 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
83. Schneider v. State, 183 So.2d 593 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
84. McLain v. State, 178 So.2d 208 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
85. Male v. State, 189 So.2d 521 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
86. 197 So.2d 574 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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Thirdly, Escobedo and Miranda could have been circumvented because
the court considered that the state's evidence that the confession was
voluntary was insufficient. A dissenting opinion did not consider Escobedo
to be applicable.
A very significant change in this area resulted from the Florida
courts' adoption of the principle of Massiah v. United States. In Wil-
liams v. State"8 the defendant's confession was obtained by interrogation
in absence of counsel after the defendant had been indicted and had ob-
tained counsel, but he had not requested that counsel be present at the
time he confessed. The court reversed the defendant's conviction and
stated that it must adopt the principles of Massiah because,
While the Massiah case involved a federal court conviction and
the court's opinion derived from the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments, the conclusion is inescapable that the same result would
have been arrived at, through utilization of the Fourteenth
Amendment, if the criminal conviction had been in a state
court.
B. Illegal Detention-Interrogation
The change in the law of confessions as a result of Wong Sun 9 is
illustrated by Outten v. State.90 The defendant was arrested on suspicion
of automobile theft, taken to jail and charged with vagrancy. He made
incriminating statements. After he was moved to a different part of the
jail and informed of his constitutional rights, he confessed. Since the trial
court held that his initial statements were illegally obtained and inad-
missible, the admissibility of the subsequent confession was in issue on
appeal. The court reversed and remanded holding that: (1) the result
of illegal detention is to exclude verbal as well as tangible evidence, pro-
vided the improper influences had not been effectively removed and
(2) even though the confession followed some time after the illegal deten-
tion the debilitating influences are presumed to carry over and permeate
subsequent interrogation unless the improper influences had been ef-
87. 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964):
We hold that the petitioner was denied basic protections when there was used
against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal
agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the
absence of his counsel.
88. 188 So.2d 320 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
89. 371 U.S. 463, 471 (1963):
Thus verbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an
unauthorized arrest'. . . is no less the "fruit" of official illegality than the more
common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion. . . . We need not hold that
all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come
to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in
such a case is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evi-
dence . . . has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."
90. 197 So.2d 594 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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fectively removed. (3) The evidence did not indicate effective removal
of improper influences. 91
The court in French v. State92 following the aforementioned princi-
ples held that where the defendant confessed after confrontation with
tangible evidence illegally obtained, the confession was inadmissible as
"fruit of the poisonous tree."
In spite of the general trend indicated above, Florida courts con-
tinue to reject the McNabb-Mallory Rule, and have held that an unrea-
sonable delay in bringing the defendant before a magistrate does not
render the confession inadmissible unless the defendant can prove that
the delay induced the confession."3
C. Voluntary
A confession is inadmissible if involuntary, and the state bears the
burden of proving that the confession was voluntary. 4 However, a con-
fession made in a weakened condition has been held to be admissible. 5
The court distinguished the case from Reddish v. State9" where the de-
fendant was not alert due to the effects of demerol. Admission of a con-
fession made while under the influence of tranquillizers was not error
where the defendant testified to the same facts at the trial.9 7
D. Miscellaneous
Where, contrary to the usual procedure, the trial judge heard evi-
dence relative to the admissibility of the confession in the presence of the
jury, the appellate court held that no prejudical error occurred since the
confession was admitted into evidence.98
Admitting into evidence a portion of a co-defendant's confession was
not reversible error where the defendant admitted to an officer that the
portion admitted was true.99
Since granting a motion for severance or exclusion of a co-defend-
ant's confession is a matter of discretion, ordinarily refusal is not grounds
91. The court cited Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Hoffman v. McGinnes, 277 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1960) ; Nueslein
v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940) and Upshaw v. United States, 335
U.S. 410 (1948).
92. 198 So.2d 668 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
93. Barton v. State, 193 So.2d 618 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967) ; Nixon v. State, 178 So.2d 620
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
94. Williams v. State, 188 So.2d 320 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
95. Myrick v. State, 177 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
96. 167 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1964).
97. Kimmons v. State, 178 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
98. Brown v. State, 181 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
99. Seely v. State, 191 So.2d 78 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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for reversal in absence of prejudice. 00 Where a co-defendant's confession
was admitted, courts have considered that the defendant was adequately
protected by an instruction to disregard the confession while considering
the guilt or innocence of the defendant.'
The necessary constitutional safeguards were satisfied where the
juvenile court had jurisdiction over the juvenile, and juvenile authorities
granted the city police permission to interrogate, and the juvenile was ad-
vised of his constitutional rights before he confessed. 2
State v. Hodges0 3 announced the principle that the error of intro-
ducing a confession before extraneous evidence established prima facie
proof of the corpus delicti may be cured by subsequent sufficient evidence
of the corpus delicti. Subsequently the Supreme Court of Florida in
Hodges v. State0 4 found that the subsequent evidence was insufficient. 5
In Bogan v. State'08 the court held that no reversible error occurred
where the state failed to introduce a confession which contained state-
ments beneficial to the defendant when the defendant testified to such
statements.
IV. SEARCH AND SEIZUR.
In the past Florida courts have not been quick to adopt federal
views regarding search and seizure. A case decided by the Second District
Court of Appeal,' 0 7 is particularly interesting for the opinion quotes lib-
erally from federal cases10 8 to support a "federal" position not required by
Florida precedent nor the facts of the case. In the past a valid arrest and
search could be based upon probable cause. A previous decision'0 9 had
indicated that the safer procedure would be to secure a search warrant
preliminary to stopping a motorist and searching his car. Acting Chief
Judge Pierce in Carter v. State stated:
We think the time has come when it is not only "safer pro-
cedure" but it should be required procedure for an officer to
comply with the constitution and statutory provisions . . . and
court decisions construing them before making a search pro-
vided always, that he had reasonable opportunity, both in point
100. Campfield v. State, 189 So.2d 642 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
101. Coney v. State, 193 So.2d 57 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966) ; Kinsey v. State, 193 So.2d 437
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1967) (a myth in the writer's opinion).
102. State v. Francois, 197 So.2d 492 (Fla. 1967).
103. 169 So.2d 361 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
104. 176 So.2d 91 (Fla. 1965).
105. Accord, Manuel v. State, 190 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
106. 188 So.2d 28 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
107. Carter v. State, 199 So.2d 324, 334 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
108. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98 (1959) ; Walker v. United States, 125 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1942).
109. Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1953).
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of time and circumstances to do so. We, therefore, hold that
where an arrest or search is made by an officer without a war-
rant, the State must be prepared to show, not only the factual
existence at such time of probable cause, but also that the officer
or officers had no reasonable opportunity to previously apply for
and be issued an arrest warrant; otherwise the evidence as to
the fruits of the search goes out." 0
It is important to note that the court could have limited its decision to
its finding that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest. The
officers had kept a house under surveillance and had seen no illegal ac-
tivity nor any indication that the occupants were intending to leave. The
officers, without a warrant stopped the defendant while driving his truck,
arrested and searched him. On petition for rehearing the state requested
the court to recede from the holding quoted above. The petition was
denied, Associate Judge Stephenson dissenting.
A similar problem arose in the Third District Court of Appeal."'
Officers in a patrol car received a message that a car of a certain descrip-
tion contained stolen property, a stolen license plate and that the occu-
pants were en route to commit a crime. The officers saw a car of that
description, noticed that it was being driven in an erratic fashion, and
arrested the defendant for careless driving, driving without a license and
driving while under the influence of alcohol. The officers searched the car
and found a stolen license plate under the hood. The conviction for con-
cealing stolen property was appealed on the basis that the car was to be
towed away, and thus a search warrant should have been obtained prior
to searching the car. The conviction was affirmed. The court reasoned
that the officers had probable cause to arrest and search, and the fact
that a search warrant could have been obtained after the car was towed
away was immaterial"' because "[t]he relevant test is not whether it is
reasonable to procure a search warrant but whether the search was rea-
sonable.""' No doubt the future cases which deal with the importance
of warrants will be of great interest to the profession.
The usual presumption has been that the arrest which validates a
search must be made for some stated crime. The court in Chippas v.
State,"4 citing federal authority," 5 found no reversible error in admitting
evidence obtained by a search after an arrest for "investigation." The
110. 199 So.2d 334 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967). This view is stated particularly well by Justice
Douglas in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
111. Fountain v. State, 199 So.2d 738, 740 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
112. To the same effect another decision from the Third District, Lowe v. State, 191
So.2d 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
113. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1949).
114. 180 So.2d 355 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
115. Ralph v. Pepersach, 335 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1964) ; Bell v. United States, 254 F.2d
82 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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court maintained that the facts, not the label, are critical and that the
evidence supported probable cause that a felony had been committed. 6
Contrary to a previous trend,"' during the period surveyed, the
courts have closely adhered to the principle that an arrest may not be
used as a ruse to conduct an exploratory search. In one instance officers
with an arrest warrant could have arrested the defendant elsewhere, but
preferred to arrest him in his home and search the premises as an incident
to the arrest. The court" 8 held that the evidence was inadmissible because
the arrest was a pretext to satisfy the primary purpose-a search of the
home. The court cited Jones v. United States"9 and Prather v. State
20
which states:
Law officers may not make a valid search by entry upon the
premises ostensibly for the purpose of making an arrest but in
reality for the purpose of conducting a general exploratory
search for evidence of crime. Such search is unreasonable even
though supported by probable cause or arrest warrant.
Similarly, in O'Neil v. State'2' the court, citing federal.. and Florida
authority,'2 held evidence obtained by searching the defendant's room
inadmissible where the officers could have arrested the defendant in the
lobby of his hotel but waited until he entered his room.
The same policy prevented the use of an arrest for one crime (a
minor traffic violation) to be used as a ruse to search for evidence of an
unrelated offense (possession of firearms by a felon) .124 But, of course,
where after an arrest for one crime, a reasonable search related to that
crime leads to evidence which supports probable cause that another crime
had been committed, continued search is permitted. 25 The fact that the
arrest was made outside an automobile did not preclude officers from
taking bolita tickets in plain sight on the seat of the car. 26 Search of an
automobile in absence of the owner was upheld where the officers had
probable cause to believe that it contained stolen property.
27
Probable cause must precede any search. Police officers in one case
116. Walker v. State, 196 So.2d 8 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967) and Gossett v. State, 188 So.2d
836 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966) were decided on difficult questions of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence as to probable cause.
117. Wills, Criminal Law and Procedure, Survey of Florida Law, 20 U. MIAmi L. REV.
266 (1965).
118. Stanley v. State, 189 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
119. 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
120. 182 So.2d 273, 275 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
121. 194 So.2d 40 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
122. Henderson v. United States, 12 F.2d 528 (4th Cir. 1926).
123. Chapman v. State, 158 So.2d 578 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
124. Riddlehoover v. State, 198 So.2d 651 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
125. Gibson v. State, 180 So.2d 685 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
126. State v. Smith, 193 So.2d 23 (Flad 3d Dist. 1966).
127. Beck v. State, 181 So.2d 659 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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saw the defendant carrying a package. They questioned him and he indi-
cated that the package contained clothes. When the officers asked to
inspect it, the defendant admitted that it was a radio and handed it to
the officers. The radio was not admissible because a search made prior
to an arrest without probable cause is unlawful.'28
In Rodriguez v. State29 the majority held that when entering a home
without a warrant, an initial announcement of authority was sufficient
and need not be repeated at inner doors.
In Treverrow v. State'30 the court, citing Jones v. United States, 1'
held that evidence supplied by an unnamed confidential informant was
sufficient to support a search warrant without the benefit of additional
evidence if there was a substantial basis for crediting the information
given. The case reached the Supreme Court of Florida1 2 on an alleged
conflict of decisionsY.3 The court found no conflict because each case is
determined by the balance of interests rather than by a fixed rule. The
court held that disclosure of the identity of the informant was not neces-
sary and noted that the defendant made no allegations of what could be
accomplished by disclosure, made no motion for disclosure before trial,
and did not make disclosure an issue in his motion for a new trial. The
officer had stated that the informant was reliable and had had direct
observation of the evidence.
Paula v. State' 4 reaffirmed the view that evidence which might be
inadmissible at trial may be used to support a search warrant.
The court in Boim v. State,35 citing federal authority, 36 held that
the commission of a trespass while obtaining evidence to support an arrest
warrant would not invalidate the warrant where the evidence was clearly
visible without the necessity of the trespass. The validity of a warrant
was upheld where the signature of the magistrate was made by someone
else by use of a rubber stamp where such practice was authorized by
the magistrate and done in his constructive presence.3 7
The property interest necessary to contest the validity of a search
has been of special concern in Florida since State v. Leveson 38 in which
128. Moore v. State, 181 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
129. 189 So.2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
130. 184 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
131. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
132. Treverrow v. State, 194 So.2d 250 (Fla. 1967).
133. Chacon v. State, 102 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1957) ; Cooper v. State, 143 So.217 (Fla. 1932);
Harrington v. State, 110 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959).
134. 188 So.2d 388 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
135. 194 So.2d 313 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
136. Mosco v. United States, 301 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Teasley v. United States,
292 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1961).
137. State v. Hickman, 189 So.2d 254 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
138. 151 So.2d 283, 285 (Fla. 1963).
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the court declined to adopt the federal standard that anyone legitimately
on the premises has sufficient standing to contest the legality of the
search.'39 The problem arose recently where the defendant was arrested
in the apartment searched. He had a key, had spent nights and left a few
personal articles in the apartment, but lived elsewhere. The court 140 held
that he did not have standing to contest because he was not the owner,
lessee nor lawful occupant.' 4 '
In a case of considerable interest the state argued that the defendant
had waived his right to contest the admissibility of evidence by failing to
move to suppress evidence prior to trial. The court 142 pointed out that the
diversity of opinion on the point could be harmonized on the following
basis: a motion before trial is necessary when, as in the instant case, the
issue is a controversial question of fact, but not necessary if the illegality
appears from an admitted fact or from the face of the warrant or affidavit
and thus raises a question of law.
In Talavera v. State'43 the court held that merely failing to object
to officers "looking around" did not clearly show unqualified consent
rather than submission to authority. Consent given by a co-tenant was
held to be binding upon the defendant.'44 The court cited cases holding
that an agent,14' a father,'14 6 and a mistress 147 may consent to a search for
another.
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY LAW OF STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
An attorney was informed against and arrested in connection with
fees charged in an adoption. In an appeal from habeas corpus proceedings
Florida Statutes, section 72.40(2) (a) (1965) allowing reasonable fees or
costs in adoption suits was held to be unconstitutional because it failed to
establish an ascertainable standard of guilt. The court considered that
neither decisions of the courts nor the practice of attorneys furnished
adequate guidelines as to reasonable fees. 4"
Chapter 63-752 and Chapter 63-753 dealing with selection of Grand
Juries in counties having a population of 750,000 or more were declared
unconstitutional.1
49
139. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
140. Ruiz v. State, 199 So.2d 478 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
141. To same effect Robinson v. State, 194 So.2d 29 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
142. Moffett v. State, 179 So.2d 408 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
143. 186 So.2d 811 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
144. Myrick v. State, 177 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
145. Fuller v. State, 31 So.2d 259 (Fla. 1947).
146. Tomlinson v. State, 176 So. 543 (Fla. 1937).
147. Baugus v. State, 141 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1962).
148. State v. Buchanan, 191 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1966).
149. State v. Cannon, 181 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1966).
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In Inman v. City of Miami5 ' the court upheld a City of Miami
Ordinance. 5' which prohibits liquor licencees from allowing homosexuals
to congregate or buy liquor in their business establishments. The court
considered that the ordinance was designed to prevent recruitment into
unlawful activity.
The following statutes and ordinances were upheld in the period sur-
veyed: Section 43-10-(7) Code of the City of Miami (profane lan-
guage),' Florida Statutes, section 317.201 (1965) (driving while intoxi-
cated),'51 Florida Statutes, section 832.05 (1965) (worthless check), 54
Florida Statutes, section 790.23 (possession of weapons by felons), 1 5
Florida Statutes, section 877.02(11) (solicitation of legal business), '
(vagrancy in Coral Gables.)' 57
A trial judge granted the defendant's motion to quash holding sec-
tions of Florida Statutes, section 323.29 (1965)158 to be unconstitutional.
Subsequently the same sequence occurred before the same trial judge. The
state appealed and the Florida Supreme Court 59 upheld the statute but
decided that it should not be applied retroactively against the defendant.
VI. THE ACCUSED As A WITNESS' 6 0
The question of whether the prosecution may state that the unex-
plained possession of recently stolen property raises an inference of guilt,
without by inference commenting upon the defendant's failure to testify
was decided for the first time in Florida in Miley v. State. 6' The court
ruled such comment was not error because the statement referred solely
to the court's instructions. Moreover, the context of the statement made
it clear that the silence referred to was at the time the defendant was
found in possession. 6 2
150. 197 So.2d 50 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
151. MIA i, FLA. CODE § 4-13.
152. Nixon v. State, 178 So.2d 620 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
153. McArthur v. State, 191 So.2d 429 (Fla. 1966).
154. Major v. State, 180 So.2d 335 (Fla. 1965); Snyder v. State, 196 So.2d 217 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1967).
155. Nelson v. State, 195 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1967).
156. State v. Williams, 183 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1966).
157. Snow v. State, 179 So.2d 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
158. Regulating motor carriers.
159. State v. White, 194 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1967).
160. FLA. STAT. § 918.09 (1965)
In all criminal prosecutions the accused may at his option be sworn as a witness in
his own behalf, and shall in such case be subject to examination as other witnesses,
but no accused person shall be compelled to give testimony against himself, nor
shall any prosecuting attorney be permitted before the jury or court to comment on
the failure of the accused to testify in his own behalf, and a defendant offering no
testimony in his own behalf, except his own, shall be entitled to the concluding argu-
ment before the jury.
161. 186 So.2d 299 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
162. See also Ard v. State, 108 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1959).
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The following statements were held to be comments upon the de-
fendant's failure to testify:
That is uncontradicted because they can't contradict it ...
They don't deny that at all.1
63
I want to point out to you, however, that the defendant in every
criminal case has a constitutional right not to testify and this is
a right that he has and it cannot be held against him because of
this constitutional right, and I want to state that if the de-
fendant does object to not having this evidence, they have the
same subpoena power as does the state. They can come in here
too .... 164
[T]here has been nothing to rebut the evidence introduced by
the state, and defense counsel has not come forward with an
explanation. 5
Previous cases have held that interrogation of the defendant by the
prosecution at trial upon his failure to testify at the preliminary hearing
was error. 6 The question was certified 6 7 to the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida'68 which expressly repudiated the earlier cases.
Where an accomplice testified that he and the defendant had com-
mitted two robberies, defense counsel was not permitted to show by
cross-examination that the defendant had been acquitted because the
record was the best evidence.6 9
Refusing to allow the defendant to make the closing argument him-
self rather than through his counsel was held to be an acceptable use
of discretion. 7°
VII. APPEAL
The court in Woolley v. State'7' held that where the defendant was
convicted in one trial under five informations, a separate notice of appeal
163. Kolsky v. State, 182 So.2d 305, 309 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
164. Carter v. State, 199 So.2d 324, 336 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
165. Flaherty v. State, 183 So.2d 607, 608 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
166. Simmons v. State, 139 Fla. 645, 190 So.756 (1939); Hathaway v. State, 100 So.2d
662 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
167. Hines v. State, 186 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
168. State v. Hines, 195 So.2d 550 (Fla. 1967).
169. Chippas v. State, 194 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1967); contra, Watson v. State, 134 So.2d
805 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961) which previously had held contra to preserve the defendant's
closing argument was expressly overruled. Urga v. State, 104 So.2d 43 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958),
not mentioned in the opinion, is related to the issue (though not directly in point) and sup-
ports Watson. There, in an abortion charge, the defendant wanted to impeach the prose-
cutrix by showing that she had made statements at the trial which were inconsistent with
statements that she had made previously. According to the best evidence rule the defendant
would be required to introduce evidence of the previous statements, and lose closing argu-
ment. To avoid this result the court held that the best evidence rule does not apply where
the purpose is impeachment rather than proof.
170. Thompson v. State, 194 So.2d 649 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
171. 193 So.2d 706 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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for each judgment was required, but followed the previous Florida prac-
tice of allowing him to elect one judgment which he wished to be con-
sidered. The court stated that no law authorized this permissive practice
and implied that it might not be continued. On the other hand where
several defendants were tried for a single offense at a consolidated trial
and the issues were identical, one notice of appeal was sufficient for all
defendants.
72
In Kinsey v. State75 the defendant filed a motion for an order
allowing notice of appeal nunc pro tunc, alleging that the defendant's
attorney at the direction of the defendant's mother filed a voluntary dis-
missal of appeal. Attached to the defendant's motion was an order of the
United States District Court of the Middle District of Florida which
stated that the dismissal of appeal was without the defendant's consent,
and that the defendant should be afforded an appeal, and if not the con-
viction would be held invalid. In spite of this order the court denied the
motion on the basis of the Florida Appellate Rules 174 which make the
attorney the defendant's agent and stated that otherwise "there would be
little or no stability or certainty in any court decision."
In Ramey v. State 75 the state moved to dismiss the defendant's
appeal because the defendant had entered a plea of guilty. The state
172. Lowe v. State, 184 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1966).
173. 179 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
174. Florida Appellate Rule 3.13(b)
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF CAUSES. The moving party in any proceedings,
original or appellate, may procure dismissal of such proceedings at any time by filing
with the clerk of the Court a notice for dismissal. Where the opposing party or
parties have filed responsive pleadings or assignments of error or cross-petition, such
notice for dismissal shall be by all such parties.
Florida Appellate Rule 2.3(d)
ATTORNEY AS AGENT OF CLIENT.
(1) Service Upon Attorney. In all matters relating to the prosecution or defense
of any matter in the Court, the attorney of record shall be accepted as the agent of
his client, and any notice by or to such attorney, act of his, or step taken by him in
the prosecution or defense of such proceeding, shall be accepted as the act, notice to,
or step of the client.
(2) Withdrawal of Attorney. An attorney of record will not be permitted to with-
draw from a cause unless his withdrawal is sanctioned by the Court. He may file
his motion for that purpose in the Court setting up the reasons for his withdrawal. A
copy of said motion or petition shall be served on the client and the attorney for
the adverse party.
(3) Additional Attorneys. After an appeal or other proceeding has been filed or
docketed in the Court, additional authorized attorneys may appear and participate,
prior to the time the cause is presented to the Court for decision on the merits, with-
out the necessity of securing permission of the Court on filing written appearance in
the office of the clerk of the Court and serving a copy thereof upon opposing counsel
prior to its filing.
(4) After the date any cause in the Court is presented to the Court for a decision
on the merits, no additional attorneys other than the original attorneys of record or
those who have noted their appearance in said cause prior to the date the same is
presented to the Court for a decision on the merits shall be permitted to appear or
participate therein except upon leave of the Court for good cause shown, and pro-
vided a copy of the application for leave to appear shall have been served upon
opposing counsel at least five days prior to the entry of any order allowing such
appearance.
175. 199 So.2d 104 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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cited several cases'76 for the proposition that a plea of guilty by the
defendant constitutes a waiver of all defects not jurisdictional, and that
a judgment on a plea of guilty is not subject to appellate review. The
court noted that each previous case was decided on the merits and that the
above proposition was mere obiter dictum. The court denied the motion to
dismiss and declared that all matters in Gibson v. State which were con-
trary to the present decision were superseded.
The Supreme Court of Florida in Harrell v. State177 held that when
the defendant filed a notice of appeal and subsequently moved for a new
trial, the appellate court retained complete and exclusive jurisdiction.
This decision resolved an apparent conflict which had existed in the dis-
trict courts of appeal.
7 8
After revocation of probation, the defendant, could not appeal the
judgment of conviction because 90 days had passed. However, the court
noted that the revocation could be appealed within 90 days. 79
When the appellant escaped during the pendency of an appeal, dis-
missal of appeal without prejudice was granted as a matter of descre-
tion.8 0 The court felt that the escape deprived the defendant's attorney
of the opportunity of conferring with his client relative to prosecution
of the appeal.
VIII. CHARGE TO THE JURY
Florida Statutes, section 919.14 (1965) requires that in all cases
where the indictment or information charges an offense which is divided
into degrees the court shall charge the jury as to the degrees of the offense.
A series of cases have held that failure to charge the jury as to lesser
included offenses is not fundamental error where there was no request
for such a charge and no evidence presented relevant to a lesser included
offense.' 8' In Brown v. State' the defendant made an oral request for
such an instruction. The appellate court held that regardless of whether
the request was oral or written, instruction on lesser included offenses
is not required unless all the essential elements of the lesser included
offense are alleged in the charge and established by the evidence, and
176. Gibson v. State, 173 So.766 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965) ; Cole v. State, 172 So.2d 607 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1965) ; Perez v. State, 151 So.2d 865 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963) ; Baggs v. Frederick, 168
So.252 (Fla. 1936).
177. 197 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1967).
178. Padgett v. State, 197 So.2d 864 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967) ; Bannister v. Hart, 144 So.2d
853 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962).
179. Burgess v. State, 194 So.2d 698 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
180. Decree v. State, 180 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
181. Johnson v. State, 130 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1961); Jefferson v. State, 128 So.2d 132
(Fla. 1961) ; Toler v. State, 193 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967) ; Flagler v. State, 189 So.2d
212 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966) ; Silver v. State, 174 So.2d 91 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) ; State v. Brown,
118 So.2d 574 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1960).
182. 191 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
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unless the evidence is susceptible of the inference that the defendant
committed the lesser offense but not the greater. Therefore, the court
held that the failure to instruct was not error because evidence which
established violence was obvious and the jury could not have inferred
that the defendant had committed larceny but not robbery.183 However,
the Supreme Court of Florida in McClendon v. State8 4 adopted a less
restrictive view to the effect that an instruction was required only on
lesser offenses that the record would support.
Decisions have been in conflict as to whether the duty to instruct
should be based upon the allegations in the charge or the evidence in the
record. 85
In Hand v. State88 the court held that the instruction is not required
if the evidence supports the higher offense. The problem was brought to
the Supreme Court of Florida in Hand v. State187 as a consolidation of
the Hand case and Raulerson v. State.' The court held that matters of
evidence should rest with the jury rather than the judge and noted that
a verdict of guilty of a lesser homicide will not be disturbed even though
there was no evidence of that degree of homicide.'89 The court specifically
held that the trial judge's refusal to charge in the Hand case was error
and that the court should have instructed the jury that if they were
unable to find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendants were guilty of the crime charged-robbery-that they could
consider the evidence to determine if they were guilty of the lesser in-
cluded offense of larceny, and that the court should define and explain
the crime. The court's opinion was buttressed by the fact that as a matter
of law every robbery includes the offense of larceny. The court noted
that both defendants had requested the instruction.
The instructions should include and define all the essential elements
of the crime. Therefore, new trials were ordered where the judge refused
to instruct as to premeditated design 9 and where the judge in an
instruction on burglary neglected to specify the particular felony
involved.'
183. Cf. Flagler v. State, 198 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1967); Siekman v. State, 198 So.2d 352
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
184. 196 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1967).
185. Goswick v. State, 143 So.2d 817 (1962) (instruction based on evidence in the
record) ; Allison v. State, 162 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) (instruction based on allega-
tions in the charge).
186. 188 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
187. 199 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1967). The court overruled Brown v. State, 191 So.2d 296
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1966) and Silver v. State, 174 So.2d 91 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
188. 188 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
189. Killen v. State, 92 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1957). This view supports arguments previously
made by Justice Drew in his dissenting opinion in the Brown case.
190. Polk v. State, 179 So.2d 236 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
191. Robles v. State, 188 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1966).
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Two cases held that where the defendant was charged solely with
the direct commission of a crime, instructions to the jury on aiding and
abetting were proper and convictions for aiding and abetting were af-
firmed, 192 when supported by reasonable inferences of the evidence.
The transmission of written instructions by the trial judge to the
jury after the jury had received oral instructions and retired was held
not to be reversible error in absence of a showing of prejudice.' 93
IX. SENTENCE
The Supreme Court of Florida in Drayton v. State"4 affirmed per
curiam the appellate court decision which held that the trial court did
not lose jurisdiction by entering an unlawful suspended sentence, and
may subsequently enter a lawful sentence. 195
Where the defendant challenged the validity of a life sentence al-
leging that the trial judge indicated that he would sentence the defendant
to death unless he stated the facts of the case in open court, the court
held that no prejudice resulted because a life sentence was the minimum
penalty possible for the conviction entered.'
The court in Tirko v. Wainwright9 7 interpreted Florida Statutes, sec-
tion 944.40 (1965), which provides that the sentence for escape shall be
in addition to any former sentence, to imply that the sentences should
run consecutively rather than concurrently.
Florida Statutes, section 776.04(2) (1965) provides that if the crime
attempted is
[P]unishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life, or for
five years or more, the person convicted of such attempt shall
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding
five years, or in the county jail not exceeding one year.
Florida Statutes, section 776.04(3) provides that if the crime attempted
[I] s punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a term
of less than five years ... the person convicted of such an at-
tempt shall be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding one
year.
The defendant was convicted of an attempt to break and enter with intent
to commit a misdemeanor for which the maximum sentence is five years.
192. Newman v. State, 196 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1967), Justice Drew dissenting; Jacobs v.
State, 184 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
193. Kimmons v. State, 178 So.2d 608 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965). This decision overruled
Holton v. State, 2 Fla. 476 (1849).
194. 181 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1966).
195. Drayton v. State, 177 So.2d 250 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
196. Williford v. State, 181 So.2d 372 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
197. 178 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1965).
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The court 198 stated that the problem of which section of the statute should
apply had produced conflicting decisions 9 ' and decided that the most
logical conclusion was to apply Florida Statutes, section 776.04(3) since
the conviction was punishable by less than five years. 0
The court in Watson v. State2 01 held that a sentence of death was not
error where the jury was evenly split on a recommendation of mercy.
In Wyche v. State202 the court held that enhanced punishment was
permissible for multiple violations of Florida Statutes, section 849.09-the
Florida lottery statute-even though the violations were of different sec-
tions of the statute. The court noted that when a defendant is convicted
on more than one count of the same information, but each is a part of the
same transaction, only one sentence may be imposed.
X. METROPOLITAN COURT
In Trujillo v. State2°3 the court held that where the defendant was
convicted under section 30-15A of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County
which provides for a maximum sentence of 60 days or a fine of $500 or
both, he was not entitled to a jury trial under section 6.15D of the Home
Rule Charter and section 11-14 of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County
which provides for a jury trial if the offense is punishable by a fine ex-
ceeding $500 or imprisonment for more than 60 days. Judge Swann dis-
sented on the basis that ambiguities should be construed to protect the
right of trial by jury. The writer agrees.
The Third District Court of Appeal204 held that a Metro ordinance
may provide for a higher penalty than state law for the same offense.
XI. FORMER JEOPARDY
Ordinarily the defense of former jeopardy applies after one has been
acquitted of the same crime. However an acquittal of a charge of at-
tempted bribery under Florida Statutes, section 838.011 was a bar to
prosecution for an offer of reward to a public officer under Florida Statute
section 838.071 because the offenses were so closely related and involved
the same evidence.05
198. Fitz v. State, 196 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
199. Edge v. State, 170 So.2d 596 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) (applying FLA. STAT. § 776.04(2)
(1965)) ; Floyd v. State, 170 So.2d 599 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964) (applying FLA. STAT. § 776.04(2)
(1965)); Williams v. State, 101 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1958) (applying FLA. STAT.
§ 776.04(3) (1965)).
200. In the writer's opinion this decision is contra to the wording of the statute.
201. 190 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1966).
202. 178 So.2d 875 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
203. 187 So.2d 390 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
204. State v. Buchanan 190 So.2d 594 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
205. State v. Carroll, 189 So.2d 273 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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In State ex rel. Glenn v. Klein, °6 the court held that a conviction of
manslaughter based on the homicide-felony rule where the death which
occurred during a robbery was not committed by the defendant implied
a conviction for robbery and barred subsequent prosecution for robbery.
In the presence of defense counsel but in the absence of the defen-
dant an alternate juror told the judge that his wife was ill. The judge told
the attorneys that unless the defense would stipulate that the alternate
juror be discharged he would give consideration to a declaration of mis-
trial. The defense attorney suggested that the prosecution move for a
mistrial. The state attorney indicated that he would. The judge asked the
defense counsel if he had any comment and received a negative reply. The
judge on his own motion declared a mistrial. The appellate court held that
the mistrial was declared for insufficient reasons but the defense attorney
by his conduct had consented, thereby precluding the defendant from
raising the defense of double jeopardy in a subsequent prosecution on the
same indictment. 0
The defendant's defense of res judicata to a manslaughter charge due
to an acquittal of a "hit and run" charge failed. The court held208 that he
did not show that the acquittal of the first offense was based on a particular
issue or fact which would preclude conviction for the second but merely
alleged acquittal of the misdemeanor. Under a plea of res judiciata the
same facts and issues must be involved, while under a plea of former
jeopardy only a prior acquittal for the same offense need be shown. There
was no intimation that he was acquitted of the "hit and run" charge be-
cause he was not the driver. If such were the case and if the point had
been proven his defense might have been successful.
XII. DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
The court in Cole v. State °0 held that a defendant's right to be
present 210 could not be waived by defense counsel in the absence of the
defendant's knowledge and consent. Therefore, where a defendant, who
had plead not guilty by reason of insanity was not present at the request
of defense counsel when a physician testified, his conviction was reversed.
XIII. PRELIUINARY HEARING
Holding a defendant without preliminary hearing2 ' for two days
while evidence was obtained was held not to be harmful error.212 Some of
the evidence obtained was identification of the defendant during a line up.
206. 184 So.2d 904 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
207. Adkins v. Smith, 197 So.2d 865 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
208. Busbee v. State, 183 So.2d 27 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
209. 181 So.2d 698 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
210. FLA. STAT. § 914.01 (1965).
211. FLA. STAT. § 901.23 (1965).
212. Palmieri v. State, 189 So.2d 512 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
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The decision affirmed the Florida position that a preliminary hearing
under Florida Statutes, section 901.23 is not a necessary step in criminal
prosecution.213 This view was extended to preliminary hearings under
Florida Statutes, section 909.04 (1965)214 by Evans v. State.18 The court
held that where no harmful error was shown, the omission of the hearing
would not be cause for reversal.
XIV. FAIR TRIAL
After "the Rule" had been invoked, a detective heard the defendant
testify that he had not confessed. Subsequently the detective voluntarily
testified that the defendant had confessed to him. Such procedure was
held to be reversible error,216 for evidently the detective's testimony had
been prompted by what he overheard.
Prejudicial error resulted from a wife and sister testifying to their
relationship with the deceased when this evidence was prejudicial and not
necessary for identification and Where the evidence was merely cumula-
tive. 17
An accomplice testified that the state had promised to mitigate one
sentence if he would testify. In fact he had been promised mitigation in
a second sentence unrelated to the crime involved in the instant case. The
court 218 stated it would not speculate on the jury's reaction had it known
the true facts as to both sentences and ordered a new trial.219 The policy
behind the decision was that an accomplice's testimony should be cau-
tiously received by a jury. Therefore, they should be aware of all the fac-
tors bearing on credibility.
Where a witness restated testimony he had given in counsel's ab-
sence, the conviction was affirmed.22°
A death sentence for rape was affirmed in Craig v. State221 without
discussion. The case is of interest because of the view expressed in Justice
213. However, the court stated that it did not condone bypassing the process.
214. ARREST ON CAPIAS BASED ON INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION:
HABEAS CORPUS; MOTION TO QUASH; PRELIMINARY HEARING.-
When an indictment or information is filed and a defendant is in custody under a
capias he may apply for a writ of habeas corpus, attacking said indictment or in-
formation; or he may move to quash the indictment or information and bring it
on to be heard before the trial court having jurisdiction. If a defendant so in cus-
tody upon a capias as aforesaid is confined in jail for thirty days after his arrest,
without trial, he may apply to the trial court having jurisdiction for and be al-
lowed a preliminary hearing.
215. 197 So.2d 323 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
216. Jackson v. State, 177 So.2d 353 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965). "The Rule" referred to is
that which requires sequestration of witnesses.
217. Gibson v. State, 191 So.2d 58 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
218. Wolfe v. State, 190 So.2d 394 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
219. Accord, Sanders v. State, 190 So.2d 398 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
220. Childs v. State, 190 So.2d 605 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
221. 179 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1965).
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Ervin's dissenting opinion that the jury should first determine guilt or in-
nocence and then consider mercy. He proposed that this two-stage pro-
cedure is necessary to give "constitutional operation" to the rape stat-
ute222 and that Florida Statutes, section 919.2321 could be interpreted to
allow for such procedure.
The unfortunate rule that perjured evidence is grounds for reversal
only if the state knew it to be false was affirmed.224
The following remarks by the prosecution were held to be prejudicial:
Do you want to give this man less than first degree murder and
the electric chair and have him get out and come back and kill
somebody else, maybe you?225
referring to the defendant's father,
[WJho was convicted last week . . .
When you go home tonight . . . if your wife wasn't there be-
cause she had been murdered . . . I ask you what you would
feel about that?
227
The following remark by the judge was held to be prejudicial:
I realize some people don't believe in it [capital punishment]
and I also realize that some of those people that say they don't
believe in it, if their little daughter or their wife was raped, they
would believe in it fast.228
A hearing under Rule 1.850 was ordered where the petitioner alleged
222. FLA. STAT. § 794.01 (1965)
RAPE AND FORCIBLE CARNAL KNOWLEDGE; PENALTY.-Whoever rav-
ishes and carnally knows a female of the age of ten years or more, by force and
against her will, or unlawfully or carnally knows and abuses a female child under
the age of ten years, shall be punished by death, unless a majority of the jury in
their verdict recommend mercy, in which event punishment shall be by imprison-
ment in the state prison for life, or for any term of years within the discretion of
the judge. It shall not be necessary to prove the actual emission of seed, but the
crime shall be deemed complete upon proof of penetration only.
223. RECOMMENDATION TO MERCY.-(1) In all criminal trials, the jury,
in addition to a verdict of guilty of any offense, may recommend the accused to the
mercy of the court or to executive clemency, and such recommendation shall not
qualify the verdict except in capital cases. In all cases the court shall award the sen-
tence and shall fix the punishment or penalty prescribed by law.
(2) Whoever is convicted of a capital offense and recommended to the mercy of
the court by a majority of the jury in their verdict, shall be sentenced to imprison-
ment for life; or if found by the judge of the court, where there is no jury, to be
entitled to a recommendation to mercy, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life,
at the discretion of the court.
224. Wade v. State, 193 So.2d 459 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967); Smith v. State, 191 So.2d
618 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966) ; Brown v. State, 177 So.2d 518 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
225. Grant v. State, 194 So.2d 612, 613 (Fla. 1967).
226. Smith v. State, 194 So.2d 310, 312 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
227. Adams v. State, 192 So.2d 762; 763 (Fla. 1966).
228. Coley v. State, 185 So.2d 472, 473 (Fla. 1966).
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that the prosecuting attorney previously had been a Public Defender and
interrogated the petitioner about the case.229
Instructions by the judge to the jury to disregard evidence were held
to preserve a fair trial3 0 where evidence showed that the defendant had
pleaded guilty to a magistrate. Moreover, where the judge first admitted
items of personal property and subsequently decided they were the prod-
uct of an illegal search and instructed the jury to disregard them, no error
was shown.231
A denial of severance was held not to be an abuse of discretion when
the co-defendants accused each other but neither testified.232 However,
precluding the defendant from presenting closing arguments' 3 and unduly
limiting the defense attorney's cross-examination2 34 was error.
It was not error to exclude jurors opposed to capital punishment
235
nor to exclude jurors who stated that they would recommend mercy if they
found the defendant guilty of rape.
23 6
Since conviction of aiding and abetting does not depend upon convic-
tion of the principal, the trial judge's instruction that the co-defendant
pled guilty was error.3 7
The failure of the state to disclose the identity of an informant may
be relevant to the validity of the warrant or to the preparation of the de-
fense. The latter point was in issue in Spataro v. State.2 ' Both the female
defendant and a female witness for the state had access to the room in
which narcotics were found. The only inference of possession by the de-
fendant was testimony that the drugs did not belong to the witness. The
informant, according to the affidavit for the search warrant, had bought
the drugs from a female. Citing federal and foreign authority,239 the court
held disclosure was necessary for proper preparation of a defense.
In Simmons v. State24 the court held that a motion to quash should
229. Young v. State, 177 So.2d 345 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). Accord, State v. Leigh, 178
KAN. 549, 289 P. 2d 774 (1955) ; State v. Burns, 322 S.W.2d 736 (Mo. 1959).
230. Rollins v. State, 179 So.2d 377 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
231. Lee v. State, 191 So.2d 84 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
232. Hawkins v. State, 199 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1967).
233. Ruffin v. State, 195 So.2d 26 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
234. Kirkland v. State, 185 So.2d 5 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
235. Sims v. State, 184 So.2d 217 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
236. Pitts v. State, 185 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1966). The court relied heavily on FLA. STAT.
§ 932.20 (1941) which states:
No person whose opinions are such as to preclude him from finding any defendant
guilty of an offense punishable with death shall be allowed to serve as a juror on
the trial of any capital case.
237. Moore v. State, 186 So.2d 56 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
238. 179 So.2d 873 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
239. Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964); Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53 (1957) ; People v. Durazo, 52 Cal. 2d 354, 340 P.2d 594 (1959).
240. 182 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
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have been granted where common laborers as a class were systematically
and intentionally excluded from the venire.
XV. IMMUNITY
The defendant and the State Attorney entered into an agreement
whereby the defendant would not be prosecuted if the results of the poly-
graph test showed him to be innocent. The court held that the trial judge
implied approval by removing the case from the docket so that the test
might be conducted, 241 and that such action was a pledge of public faith
which could not be lightly disregarded.
XVI. EVIDENCE
Under the rule that evidence of prior criminal activity is not admis-
sible if the sole relevancy is bad character or propensity, statements of
previous homosexual activity were held to be inadmissible in a trial for a
crime against nature.242
The following statements were held to be inadmissible: a statement
by a juvenile in response to a request by the court whereby he admitted
involvement in the crime in order to mitigate sentence; 43 a statement by
the defendant to an officer that he would either not be convicted or be
placed on probation; 244 a statement by the prosecution that:
[T]he police got a picture of the defendant in this case and
mixed it in with. . . other mug shots ....
A statement of a witness referring to apicture,
[T]hat was taken immediately after . . . he murdered my
nephew.246
Moreover, the placing of guns and shells, which were not introduced into
evidence, before the jury was error.
247
The court in Roberts v. State,24 8 relying on Johnson v. State249 held
that although the results of polygraph tests may be excluded from evi-
dence, statements voluntarily made by the defendant to the polygraph
operator are admissible. The opinion was not explicit as to whether de-
fense counsel was present nor was the defendant advised of his constitu-
241. State v. Davis, 188 So.2d 24 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
242. Harris v. State, 183 So.2d 291 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
243. Brooks v. State, 183 So.2d 550 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
244. Jenkins v. State, 177 So.2d 756 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
245. Jones v. State, 194 So.2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
246. Gibbs v. State, 193 So.2d 460, 463 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
247. Williams v. State, 188 So.2d 320 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
248. 195 So.2d 257 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
249. 166 So.2d 798 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964).
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tional rights. 250 However, if the parties stipulate to a polygraph test, use
of the results in ruling on a motion for a new trial is discretionary.251
The introduction of evidence connecting the defendant with the crime
before the introduction of evidence of the corpus delicti was held not to be
error.
2 52
In Cox v. State2 3 the court held that although Florida Statutes, sec-
tion 932.31 and section 90.04 made spouses competent witnesses against
each other, these statutes did not make confidential communications be-
tween spouses admissible.
The court in Gentile v. State,25 4 citing federal authority,255 held that
fingerprints may be taken of a person charged with a crime (robbery) and
may be used as evidence for a different crime (possession of firearms by
a felon).
Since Florida Statutes, section 317.171 provides that all accident re-
ports shall be without prejudice and shall not be used as evidence in any
trial, civil or criminal, introduction of the alcoholic content of blood taken
for the purpose of the accident report in a manslaughter charge was held
to be error.25 6
The admissibility of evidence obtained by recordings has become a
most important issue. In Florida, recordings of telephone conversations
made with the consent of one party are admissible. Telephone conversa-
tions are admissible in Florida if made over a party line, provided
the lines belonging exclusively to the defendant were not tapped, and the
defendant knew or could have known that his conversation could be heard
over the party line.
In accordance with these principles evidence was held to be admis-
sible where the telephone company refused the defendant's request for
a private line and provided a party line with facilities for the police to
record conversations.
257
In Hajdu v. State255 the court, relying on federal authority,259 held
that where a woman went for a medical examination with a radio trans-
250. The date of the events was not disclosed. In light of the trend in the law of
confessions and right to counsel, decisions such as this may be open to question.
251. State v. Brown, 177 So.2d 532 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
252. Feldman v. State, 195 So.2d 242 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
253. 192 So.2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
254. 190 So.2d 200 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
255. Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
256. Cooper v. State, 183 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966) (See Fla. Laws 1967, ch.
67-308).
257. Lee v. State, 191 So.2d 84 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
258. 189 So.2d 230 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
259. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921).
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mitter concealed in her purse so that the conversation could be heard by
a private detective, the woman could testify but the detective could not.
A general exploratory search upon persons in private circumstances
is prohibited260 but where police observed, from a place of hiding, homo-
sexual acts done in a public toilet without privacy, their testimony was
admissible.2 61
XVII. PLEA OF GUILTY
Generally, an allegation, not refuted by the record, that the plea of
guilty was coerced, warrants a hearing under Rule 1.850 even though the
petitioner was represented by counsel. 2 2 However, a hearing was denied
where the alleged coercion occurred prior to a plea of not guilty, and the
petitioner pled guilty after appointment of counsel. 2" The court felt that
the petitioner's allegations of coercion were negated by the subsequent
plea of not guilty.
The court in Ostermann v. State264 held that refusing to allow a de-
fendant to withdraw his plea of guilty was not an abuse of discretion when
originally the defendant pled not guilty and subsequently with the assist-
ance of counsel changed the plea to guilty.
XVIII. NOLO CONTENDERE
The court in Smith v. State265 held that a plea of nolo contendere was
not acceptable in a capital case. The court distinguished Peel v. State266
on the basis that the death sentence was not involved in that case. In
Roberts v. State267 the court held that the plea was not acceptable in a
capital case whether the death sentence was received or not, and remanded
with directions to permit withdrawal of the plea and to proceed as if no
plea had been made. The court so ruled even though the plea had not been
put in issue on appeal by the defendant.
XIX. SELF-INCRIMINATION
The right against self-incrimination was held not to be violated by
requiring the defendant to wear a particular jacket in a lineup,268 or to
speak in a line up, 69 (in neither case was presence or absence of counsel
260. Bielicki v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 21 Cal. 2d. 598, 371 P.2d 288,
21 CAL. Rm. 552 (1962).
261. State v. Coyle, 181 So.2d 671 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
262. Williams v. State, 186 So.2d 279 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
263. Hamilton v. State, 186 So.2d 316 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
264. 183 So.2d 873 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
265. 197 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1967).
266. 150 So.2d 281 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
267. 199 So.2d 340 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
268. Morris v. State, 184 So.2d 199 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
269. Boyer v. State, 182 So.2d 19 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
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mentioned) or to instruct the jury that possession by the defendant of
stolen property: "without reasonable . . .explanation . . .may be suf-
ficient to warrant a verdict of guilty .. .,"1o
XX. SPECIFIC CRIMES
In State v. Houghtaling27' the court held that scienter need not be
alleged nor proved in prosecutions under Florida Statutes, section 517.07
(1965) (sales of unregistered securities).
In State v. Peterson27 the court held that changing the marginal
figures of a check but not the words expressing the amount payable does
not constitute a forgery under Florida Statutes, section 831.02. The court
suggested that a charge of larceny or cheating and fraud might have been
more applicable.
In an embezzlement case273 the court reluctantly considered that the
statute of limitations began to run at the time of conversion, rather than
the time payment was demanded.
In the period surveyed the courts held that knowledge must be
proven to convict a defendant under Florida Statutes, section 398.03 (pos-
session of narcotics) even though not expressly required by the statute." 4
Lack of competence or gross ignorance of medical science was held
to be sufficient criminal negligence to convict for manslaughter even
though the treatment by a chiropractic physician conformed to the gener-
ally accepted practice of that profession and was administered in good
faith.2
XXI. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The Supreme Court of Florida has adopted a set of Rules of Criminal
Procedure which will become operative December 31, 1967, and will
supersede all conflicting rules and statutes. These rules appeared in 196
So.2d 124 (1967) along with an explanation of the changes made. Some
rules are substantially the same as previous statutes, while others make
significant modifications. The scope of this paper does not permit an ex-
haustive analysis of these rules, and only those deemed significant will be
highlighted.
Rule 1.110 prohibits televising, photographing or broadcasting judi-
cial proceedings in court.2 76
270. McClain v. State, 185 So.2d 707, 708 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
271. 181 So.2d 636 (Fla. 1965). The decision overruled the appellate court decision of
State v. Smith, 151 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
272. 192 So.2d 293 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
273. Pierce v. State, 188 So.2d 44 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
274. Frank v. State, 199 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
275. Gian-Cursio v. State, 180 So.2d 396 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
276. Similar to FED. R. Calm. P. 53.
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Rule 1.122, dealing with the preliminary hearing and its procedures,
omits the provision of Florida Statutes, section 902.11 (1965) which pro-
vided that the defendant may sign the record of his testimony and omits
all of Florida Statutes, section 902.12 which provided that the record of
the hearing be admissible at trial. These provisions were considered to be
in conflict with Escobedo v. Illinois77 and White v. Maryland.27 The rule
also requires that the transmission of records to the clerk of the court be
within seven days rather than "without delay" as previously required.
Rule 1.150(e) provides that prior to arraignment any person charged
with a felony (not any crime) not represented by counsel be advised of
his right to counsel and his right to appointed counsel if indigent, and
provides for appointment or written waiver. The rule is similar to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 44. The Federal Rule has no language limit-
ing its application to persons charged with a felony. A proposed amend-
ment would eliminate the limitation.
Rule 1.190 provides that every pre-trial motion be in writing unless
waived by the court. To conform to federal terminology the former motion
to quash is labeled "motion to dismiss." The rule further provides that the
motion to dismiss may be based upon an allegation that the facts are not in
dispute and do not establish a prima facie case of guilt, but a dismissal
will not be a bar to subsequent prosecution. The rule also provides that the
state may traverse or demur to a motion to dismiss which alleges factual
matters.2 79 The rule provides for limiting the time the defendant may be
held in custody pending filing of new charges. °
Rule 1.200 provides that upon written demand by the prosecuting
attorney, the defendant must serve notice of his intention to claim alibi
and the details thereof. If the defendant does not comply the court may
exclude all evidence of an alibi except the defendant's testimony. More-
over, the prosecuting attorney is required to send a list of rebuttal wit-
nesses to the defense. If the prosecution fails to send the list the court may
exclude the state's rebuttal evidence. This rule was modeled after statutes
in several states, notably Ohio, New York and New Jersey.
Rule 1.220 modifies and expands the scope of discovery as follows:
the defendant may inspect and copy or photograph results and reports of
physical or mental examinations, scientific tests and experiments; recipro-
cal discovery is available to the state. The defendant may now have a list
of all the state's witnesses if the defense will reciprocate.
The defendant may take depositions from any person other than a
confidential informant who will not be a witness, on a showing that the
testimony of the witness might be material, or assist in preparation of de-
277. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
278. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
279. Similar to FED. R. Caix P. 41(e).
280. Similar to FED. R. Cram. P. 12(b).
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fense, and that the person will not voluntarily give a signed statement.
The deposition should be taken in the manner provided by the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure, and information obtained subsequent to dis-
covery must be disclosed. However, the court may deny or restrict discov-
ery in order to protect witnesses from intimidation. The county will pay
costs of discovery for indigents. The rule applies in the County Judges'
Court and in Justice of the Peace Courts even though the services of a
prosecutor are limited. In such cases the judge or justices of the peace will
meet the obligations of the rule in so far as it is reasonable to do so.
Rule 1.260 provides for the consent of the state as well as the court
for waiver of a jury trial.
2
1'
Rule 1.830 deals with criminal contempt proceedings. In direct
criminal contempt proceedings, contempt may be punished summarily if
the court saw or heard the conduct committed in the actual presence of the
court. However the rule provides that the defendant shall have an oppor-
tunity to present excusing or mitigating circumstances. In indirect or con-
structive criminal contempt proceedings the judge on his own motion or
upon affidavit of any person knowing the facts may issue a "show cause"
order. The rule provides for: answer, arrest, bail, arraignment, disquali-
fication of the judge, jury hearing, judgment and sentence. The defendant




Law enforcement in the state has suffered in the past due to the fact
that local agencies operated independently without coordination of activ-
ities or communications. The Florida Bureau of Law Enforcement was
created21 to: adopt and recommend policies for coordination of the law
enforcement work of all state, county and municipal agencies; promote
cooperation between all law enforcement agencies in securing efficient
and effective law enforcement; eliminate duplication of effort; promote
economy of operation, and develop a program of crime prevention.
The Bureau consists of the Governor, the Attorney General, the
Treasurer, the Comptroller, two Sheriffs and one Chief of Police. The
Bureau shall employ an Executive Director and additional personnel on
recommendation of the Executive Director. The Bureau may solicit the
assistance of investigative personnel from other agencies with consent of
such agencies. All investigators shall be peace officers and enjoy the
privileges under Florida Statutes, section 870.05,84 Florida Statutes, sec-
281. Similar to FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a)
282. Similar to FED. R. Clam. P. 42 (a).
283. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-2207.
?84. Killing while suppressing riots.
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tion 122.3285 and Florida Laws 1967, ch. 67-408.288 The peace officers
may investigate the violation of any criminal law, bear arms, make arrests,
apply for, serve and execute search warrants.
The Bureau assumes all the powers, duties, responsibilities, appro-
priations, personnel and equipment formerly vested in the Florida Sheriffs
Bureau and the Narcotics Bureau of the State Board of Health. All
powers, duties and authority of the Attorney General to investigate viola-
tions of criminal law are vested in the Bureau. The Bureau may investi-
gate any violation of the criminal law of Florida; investigate effective law
enforcement with reference to organized crime, vice, racketeering, rioting,
inciting to riot and insurrection, and upon written request by the gov-
ernor, investigate misconduct of public officials in the performance of
their duties. The Bureau may establish a system of fingerprint analysis
and identification, a criminal analysis laboratory, a system of intrastate
communications of vital statistics and information (all state, county and
municipal agencies will transmit reports to the Bureau periodically) and
may authorize state universities and junior colleges to provide training
for peace officers." 7
An important procedural change was enacted 8 which permits the
state to appeal from pre-trial orders quashing a search warrant, or sup-
pressing evidence obtained by search and seizure, or suppressing a con-
fession or admission made by the defendant. The appeal must be taken
within thirty days before commencement of trial. The appeal stays the
cause, and if the offense is bailable, the defendant is released on his own
recognizance.
The legislature has provided 8 9 that no search warrant will be issued
to search a private dwelling unless the dwelling is being used for the un-
lawful sale, possession or manufacture of intoxicating liquor; or contains
stolen or embezzled property, or an instrument used to commit a felony;
or it is being used unlawfully for gambling, or to perpetrate frauds; or its
use is in violation of narcotics laws.
In Florida Laws 1967, ch. 67-355290 the legislature provided that the
prosecuting officer may give immunity from prosecution for the violation
of beverage laws to any minor testifying in the prosecution of another for
the violation of such laws.
Florida Laws 1967, ch. 67-308, on the basis of implied consent, au-
285. Social security and retirement benefits.
286. Death and bodily injury benefits.
287. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-230 is an additional step toward coordination of local
agencies by providing for a Police Standards Council to promote statewide standards of
qualification and training.
288. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-123.
289. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-348, which amended FLA. STAT. § '933.18 (1965).
290. Amending FLA. STAT. § 562.11 (1965).
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thorizes chemical analysis for alcoholic content of breath, urine or saliva.
The test must be incidental to a lawful arrest. The results are admissible
in civil and criminal actions. Refusal to submit to the test may result in
a six months' suspension of the license to drive.
Florida Laws 1967, ch. 67-214 provides that in all felony cases the
judgment of the court shall be in writing. If the defendant is found to be
guilty, the fingerprints of the defendant shall be affixed to the document.
Florida Statutes, section 909.21 provided that: an appointed attorney
may appeal the death sentence of an indigent defendant. In Florida Laws
1967, ch. 67-502 the legislature provided that the appeal shall be taken in
such cases.
There were numerous laws affecting the office of the public defender.
Florida Laws 1967, ch. 67-192 provides that members of the bar may
serve as special assistants to the Public Defender to represent indigents.
The legislature also passed a bill""' providing for representation of in-
digents in juvenile courts, by the public defender or voluntary representa-
tion by members of the bar. Florida Statutes, section 25.59 provides that
the public defender shall be empowered to inquire of all persons who are
incarcerated for 48 hours or longer in lieu of bond and to tender them
advice and counsel.
Florida Laws 1967, ch. 67-451, amending Florida Statute section
917.12, has changed the title from Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act to
Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders Act,292 and provided for the right to
demand speedy trial and the right to proceed to trial on the criminal
charges against him. The Act also provides that where the defendant is
found to be insane, he shall be transfered from the division of corrections
and placed temporarily in the division of mental health, to await transfer
to the Florida Research and Treatment Center. The Center has not yet
come into existence though authorized by the Child Molester Act29 in
1959. The Child Molester Act was also amended to authorize the creation
of the Center in more specific terms than did the 1959 law.294
The legislature passed Florida Laws 1967, ch. 67-42 1, which provides
that where a prisoner has been released with at least 180 days of gain
time, he shall remain on probation until expiration of the term he was
sentenced to serve or such lesser time as may be determined by the Florida
Probation and Parole Commission pursuant to Florida Statutes, section
947.1. The court has the discretionary power when sentencing to the
county jail to direct that the defendant be put on probation upon the
291. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-539 amended FLA. STAT. § 275 (1965).
292. However the definition of the offender was unchanged.
293. FLA. STAT. § 801 (1959).
294. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-516 (Apparently an effort to catalyze its development).
CRIMINAL LAW
completion of any specified portion of the sentence.2 9 Moreover, Florida
Laws 1967, ch. 67-151 authorizes the Florida Probation and Parole Com-
mission to recommend to the judge whether the accused should be re-
leased on his own recognizance pending trial of a bailable offense. The
new laws also provide for incarceration in the county jail if the total
cumulative sentences are not greater than one year even though the stat-
ute violated provides for incarceration in the state prison.296
Several substantive statutes were amended. The requirement that a
stolen vehicle be propelled by electricity, gasoline, or kerosene was
eliminated from Florida Statutes, section 811.20297 and Florida Statute
section 811 was amended2 98 to include larceny of shopping carts.
Florida Laws 1967, ch. 67-72 and Florida Laws 1967, ch. 67-435
modified Florida Statutes, section 849.09 (gambling) so as to exempt a
nationally advertised contest for prizes unless such contest depends on the
results of any horse race, harness race, dog race or jai lai. Florida Laws
1967, ch. 67-178 amended Florida Statutes, section 849 to permit chari-
table organizations to conduct bingo and guest games under certain cir-
cumstances.
Florida Statutes, section 806.05 was amended by Florida Laws 1967,
ch. 67-211 to prohibit filing of false claims for fire damage and possession
or manufacture of fire bombs with intent that they be used to burn a
building.
Florida Statutes, section 870 was amended by Florida Laws 1967, ch.
6407 to increase the maximum sentence for riot to two years.
The law relating to obscene literature was modified and now provides
that distribution of obscene material to a person under eighteen years of




Florida Laws 1967, ch. 67-340 prohibits obtaining a credit card by
false statements of financial condition; theft; receiving a card known to
be lost, mislaid or delivered by mistake; purchase of a credit card from
one other than the issuer; receiving a card as security for a debt with
intent to defraud the issuer; forgery or false signing, and the fraudulent
use of a credit card so obtained.
295. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-29; Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-204.
296. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-241, which amended FLA. STAT. § 922.051 (1965).
297. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-27.
298. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-500.
299. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-153 modifying FLA. STAT. § 847 (1965).
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